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COMES NOW the Appellant, George 1. Besaw Jr., by and through his attorney of record,
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN of the law firm of Clark and Feeney, and responds to the State's
brief.
III.
Argument
1.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN IT'S FAILURE TO SUPPRESS THE
FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS.

The State does not deny that there has never been a Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 702
hearing on field sobriety testing in the State ofldaho. The State's brief notes: "Idaho law provides
that a properly trained police officer may testifY regarding field sobriety tests, including the
horizontal gaze nystagnus test." State's Brief at p. 13. The State does not tell the Court what "a
properly trained police officer" might be. The State does not tell the Court how a police officer
might be "properly trained" to testifY regarding field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze
nystagnus test. The State does not tell the Court what information the police officer must be
trained on so he can testify about field sobriety tests including the horizontal gaze nystagnus test.
After the quote noted above, the State lists a string cite of cases from the State ofIdahol.
The State does not note any cases from outside the State of Idaho that have been written since

State v. Garrett, 119 Id. 878, 811 P .3d 488 (1990) was decided. The Garrett court, in it's
plurality decision, used the Frye standard which is no longer used in the State ofIdaho. See State

v. Faught, 127 Id. 873,876,908 P.2d 556 (1995). See also Judge Lansing dissenting opinion in

The years the cases were decided are as follows: 1995, 1992, 1991, 1997,2009,1998 and 1979.
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State v. Mazzuca, 132 Id. 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999).
The State's position is as outdated as State v. Garrett, supra, if the court compares both
to the case law that has developed regarding field sobriety testing since 1991. In Garrett, the
Court stated its reason for looking at cases outside Idaho:
"This court has not heretofore been presented with having to decide whether
HGN tests are reliable enough for their results to be admissible at trial.
However, other state courts have considered this question, and we may
properly look to their opinions for guidance. Because the reliability of a
test based on a scientifically tested phenomenon should not vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other jurisdictions have
done when HGN test results are offered as evidence in DUI cases."
(emphasis added)
At p. 880.
Idaho would be outside the norm ifit did not require use of the NHTSA standards for field
sobriety tests. In the Garrett case, the Court specifically notes that it used State v. Superior Court,
718 P.2d 171 (Arizona 1986) to support it's decision for Idaho. The Arizona Supreme Court
conducted an "in-depth" analysis of HGN testing. Garrett at p. 881. Dr. Marcelline Burns, a
research psychologist, was called to testifY in Arizona as was a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) consultant on field sobriety tests. The Garrett Court also noted that the
State in Arizona submitted articles from scientific publications and research reports done on
behalf of the NHTSA A copy of this Arizona case is attached and marked Exhibit "A" for the
benefit of the Court. The Court, in reviewing the Arizona case, will note that the NHTSA
standards were quite pronounced in the information provided to the Arizona Court.
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The Arizona Court stated as follows:
"The test's recognized margin of error provides problems as to criminal
convictions which require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
circumstances under which the test is administered at roadside mav affect the
reliability of the tests results. Nvstagnus may be caused by conditions other
than alcohol intoxication." (emphasis added)
At p. 881.
The Idaho Supreme Court determined the admissibility of scientific field sobriety tests like
the HGN should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Mr Besaw, in his first brief, pointed
out a substantial number of state decisions in which the NHTSA standards were the foundation
for properly training police officers. Without use of these national standards, a police officer's
testimony really has little value.
In Garrett, supra, the Court went on to discuss the qualifications of the officer who
testified about the administration of the HGN. In Besaw, the State provided next to nothing with
regard to Trooper Talbot's qualifications. In Garrett, the officer was attached to the select traffic
enforcement team. He was also an instructor in the use of the field sobriety tests. He attended
seminars conducted by Dr. Marcelline Burns of the Southern California Research Institute. The

Garrett Court notes:
"Dr. Burns worked with the NHTSA to develop reliable field sobriety tests,

and was one of the designers of the test testifYing before the Arizona trial
court."
At pp. 883.
The State cites the Court to State v. Stevens, 126 Id. 822 (1995). If the Court reads that
decision, it will see that the evidence in question involve the officer testifYing about the "National
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Traffic Safety Institute" or most probably the NHTSA. In State v. Stevens, supra, the officer and
the State were relying on field sobriety tests developed by the NHTSA. In State v. Gleason, 123
Id. 62 (1992), the Supreme Court calls into question the analysis of State v. Garrett. The Gleason
Court stated, "It is authoritative on the issue ofthe scientific reliability of the HGN test evidence,
however it is not authority for the appropriate test against which scientific reliability is to be
measured." At p. 65. The Gleason Court also noted, "This court reaffirms that the appropriate
test for measuring the scientific reliability of evidence is IRE 702." At p. 65.
In Gleason, supra, Deputy Wolfinger was allowed to testifY about how he administered
the test and about his opinion based on his observations in administering the test. He was allowed
to state that nystagnus or eye jerking prior to 45 degrees is a strong indicator that the driver is
under the influence of alcohol. Gleason at p. 64. The 45 degrees is a standard set by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
The Court may want to inquire of the State: Where exactly did the field sobriety test used
by Trooper Talbot on Mr. Besaw during that cold, rainy January night come from; where did the
use of the stimulus to go across the eyes come from; where did walk heel to toe nine steps and
turn come from; where did the standing on one leg for thirty second come from? The NHTSA
manual requires compliance with its standards to have valid field sobriety test results as noted in
the cases cited in the initial brief filed by Mr. Besaw.
The Court in State v. Garrett, supra, also cited to a California decision, People v. Ojeda,
225 Ca. App. 3d 404,275 Ca. Rep. 472, 474 (1990). The decision by this California Court of
Appeals actually holds as follows:
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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"We do not hold that HGN is a reliable indicator of alcohol intoxication, that
the HGN test meets Kelly/Frye standards, or that nonscientists are qualified
to correlate HGN with a particular level of blood alcohol. Nor do we decide
the extent of personal experience with a field sobriety test an officer must
have in order to use it to form an opinion on intoxication. We hold only that
an officer with sufficient experience may testify, based on his or her own
experience with the relationship between HGN and alcohol intoxication, to
an opinion that a subject was or was not under the influence."
At p. 409.
Part of the Besaw probable cause affidavit notes "field sobriety tests-meets decision
points". Gaze nystagnus yes, walk and turn yes, one leg stand yes. R. at p. 10. The alcohol
influence report specifically notes certain things that have to be done or at least have to be
checked offbythe officer regarding the HGN, vertical nystagnus, walk and turn and one leg stand.
There is even a chart that notes walk and turn and one leg stand. R. at p. 15. Where do these
decision points or factors that are set out in the alcohol influence report come from? They come
from the NHTSA standards for field sobriety testing. However, the NHTSA manual and its
standards were not important to the magistrate or District Court.
At the time of the motion hearing, the arresting officer testified that his training regarding
field sobriety test involved the NHTSA manual. Motion Hearing T. at p. 24. He testified that
there were three standardized tests and that the manual required a specific standardized testing
procedure to be followed and if not, the test weren't valid. Motion Hearing T. at p. 25,11. 4-8.
The trooper also testified about the HGN and the requirements that are set out in the manual.
Motion Hearing T. at p. 30. The trooper was also questioned about the NHTSA manual regarding
HGN. He was asked about the section that states, "If the eyes do not track together or if the pupils
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are noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorders or other injury causing the
nystagnus is present." He agreed that this was what he was trained. He specifically noted in his
police report that Mr. Besaw's pupils were unequal in size at the time ofHGN testings. Motion
Hearing T. at pp. 132-133.
Mr. Besaw is not arguing that law enforcement needs some kind of medical expertise to
associate nystagnus with being under the influence. Mr. Besaw has simply cited case law from
Idaho and across the country that notes the use of IRE 702 and how the rule should be applied
to Mr. Besaw's case.
The State argues, "He further contends that this Court should adopt the NSTSA standards
for performing field sohriety tests as a minimum standard for admission of evidence ofthe results
of those tests." State's Briefat p. 14. The State has finally gotten something right in it's analysis
ofMr. Besaw's argument. Without adopting the NHTSA standards, which are the basis for the
HGN, walk and turn and one leg stand, how in the world would the Court ever be able to gage
whether an officer's testimony has any relevance to a DUI? What happens if one officer holds
his stimulus two inches away from the person's face and the next officer holds his stimulus twenty
inches away from the person's face for the HGN? There has to be some set of standards for any
of the field sobriety tests to make any sense considering that they are based on studies done by the
NHTSA and Dr. Marcelline Burns.
Without these NHTSA standards, there are no HGN, walk and turn or one leg stand. See

State vs.

Witte~

836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), United States vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D. Md.

2002), State v. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) and State vs. 0 'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon
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1995), People v.lvfcKown, 924 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. 2010) and White v. Miller, 724 S.E.2d 768 (W.Va.

2012).
The State continues on by arguing "adopting Besaw's suggested legal tests would
necessarily involve overturning the contrary precedent cited above." State's Brief at p. 14. The
adoption of the NHTSA standards for field sobriety testing does not overturn precedent, it simply
brings up-to-date the requirements for field sobriety testings based on all the case law that has
developed since 1991.
The State, in it's brief, noted, " ... Besaw has failed to show that the magistrate or district
court erred by following well established precedent in ruling that the officer could testify
regarding field sobriety test he conducted." State's Brief at pp. 14-15. What is the well
established precedent that the district court and magistrate court followed? The trial court simply
cited to State v. Ferreira, 133 rd. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), to support his decision, but
Ferreira had nothing to do with the issues before the magistrate. The District Court simply

indicated that the standards for proper field sobriety testings were not relevant and unnecessary.
R. at p. 648, FN 4. The field sobriety test should have been suppressed because they did not
follow the standard of the NHTSA manual and the results were explained by other factors than
alcohol.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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2.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY NOT SUPPRESSING THE

BREATH TEST
A.
THE PERFOR.MANCE VERIFICATION OF THE LIFELOC FC20 WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT AS IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
SOP

The ISP Trooper should have used the 0.20 solution for the preformation verification after
Mr. Besaw's breath test. The State in it's briefing cites only to certain subsections of the
November 1, 2010, SOP to support its position, but as the Court is aware, the SOP must be read
as a whole to get the full understanding of the 0.20 solution performance verification
requirements. In this record, the e-mails that were generated by the ISPFS discuss the science of
linearity in breath testing. These e-mails also discuss the need for the 0.20 solution with regard
to 0.20 blows. Jeremy Johnston, the head of the breath testing in the State ofIdaho wrote:
"As for the 0.20 requirement, I'm suggesting not dropping it altogether, I
am just suggesting putting in some wiggle room language so that in the
event that the 0.20 is not run in a calendar month, the prosecution only
loses the enhanced penalty charge that the 0.20 checks supports and not
the entire DUI charge. DUI's deals with thresholds and for regular DUI,
the threshold is 0.08. It (sic) the proper cal checks are in place to support
that charge, then the charge should be valid. The person that blows a
0.14/0.15 should not get off on a technicality because the BTS failed to run
a cal check to support a charge that is not pending for that case. After all,
a year and a half ago, the 0.20 check wasn't even required and the
prosecution had no problems at all until they got above the 0.20 threshold
for the enhanced penalty. That was the reasoning behind instituting the
0.20 check in the first place. Cases are currently being tossed because
of this. It seems like it is a disservice to the state of Idaho to continue to
keep that loophole open." (emphasis added)
R. at p. 42.
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Please note Mr. Johnston's use of the term "wiggle room language" in how he looks at
developing the SOP. David Laycock participated in the discussion regarding the 0.20 solution.
He wrote:
"Why do we want to go backwards? I didn't say there was not testing to
show it looses alcohol just sitting there; I don't know. What happens if the
simulator is on 2417 but no tests are run? I don't think this is the time
to cut back on quality standards.
JJ, you mentioned the cases that were getting dismissed because agencies
weren't running the 0.20. They could easily cure the problem simply by
spending 30 minutes per month in complying with the SOP. They could
even save the 0.20 and use it the next month, maybe two. Face it, most
agencies would probably be happy if the SOP were trimmed down to
2 or 3 pages total."
R. at p. 43.

Isn't this last sentence about a two or three page SOP telling, and this coming from one
of the employees of the ISPFS? For the State, less is more. For the drivers ofIdaho, less is not
more. Less violates scientific principles and due process. Please note that David Laycock cites
to Dubowski as a resource for breath testing in the State ofIdaho. R. at p. 43. In addition, the
Court should note that there are cases from other parts of the country that deal with linearity in
breath testing at different intoxication levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d. 1212 (App. Div. N.J.
2011 ).
Jeremy Johnston states in an e-mail dated February 26, 2008:
"Afterall (sic), we only really care about the instruments linearity, at the
upper levels, when we had a case with results at or above the upper 0.20
level. In which case, they didn't run the 0.20 check, the linearity isn't
really in question because they would be using the 0.08 check and
threshold for prosecution. Personally, I think that 'in support of the
APPELLANT' S REPLY BRIEF
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excessive consumption charge' actually covers both bases without being
overly analytical in the SOP. Do we care if the instrument is linear at the
0.20 if the breath sample is below the 0.20 level? As long as it is above
the .08, our bases are covered.
P.S. I think that is where we are getting lost in the translation. It is good
scientific practice to check linearity because that lends credence to the
accuracy of the numbers that the instrument generates. What is
different with the BTS program is that we only need to know the accuracy
ofthe numbers at the legally relevant thresholds. The numbers in between
are irrelevant as long as they can be proven to be above the threshold that
is being charged (excessive or not)."
R. at p. 45.

Darren Jewkes states on February 25, 2008 the following:
"In addition to running a 0.20 check for excessive consumption, it should
also be run to demonstrate the linearity of the instrument. If we stated as
policy that the 0.20 checks only support excessive consumption than
agencies are more likely to skip this check on a regular basis."
R. at p. 45.

Jeremy Johnston on February 25, 2008, states:
"It absolutely would because the 'must' would be replaced with a
'should' in the case of an enhanced penalty situation. We could even
change it to read that the 0.20 should be run once and (sic) month, and
must be run to support an enhanced penalty charge. Then we have the
best of both worlds. No enhanced charge without the 0.20, but if they
don't run it, they can still charge regular DDI." (emphasis added)

R. at p. 46.

A few minute before the above noted e-mail, Jeremy Johnston writes:
"Correct, I'm just trying to close a loophole with the 0.20 and the 'must'
language that is being used by defense in the ALS to say that the
instrument that was used wasn't properly usable because the 0.20 check
wasn't performed according to the SOP."

APPELLANT' S REPLY BRIEF
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R. at p. 46.
The SOP is being changed based on what is happening with ALS hearings and DUI cases,
not what is scientifically acceptable. The State's brief agrees. State's Brief at p. 6. These e-mails
are simply discussions about what makes things easier to prosecute DUIs and get ALS
suspensions upheld. R. at p. 47.
The State's brief fails to set out the complete SOP language regarding performance
verification of breath testing instruments. The following is found in the SOP that took effect on
November 1, 2010:

"5.

Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instrument

Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho
State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath simulator
performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS.
The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of the solutions used
for the verification and includes the acceptable values may be different from those show
on the bottle label.
5.1

Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc fc20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument
Performance Verification
5.1.1

The Aleo-Senso and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing
instrument performance verification is run using approximately
0.08 and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by
and/or approved by ISPFS.

5.1.2

The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance
verification solutions consist of two samples.

5.1.3

A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc
FC20 instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance
verification solution must be performed within 24 hours,
before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary

APPELLANT' S REPLY BRlEF
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use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered by a single
performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on
the use of the 0.20 solution in this capacity.
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be
replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25
verifications or every calendar month, whichever come
first.
5.1.4

A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged
once per calendar month and replaced with fresh solution
approximately every 25 verifications or until it reaches its
expiration date, whichever comes first.
NOTE:
The 0.20 performance verification was
implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the
instruments's results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to
timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not
invalidate tests performed that yield results at other
levels or in charges other than 18-8004C.
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the
requirement for performance verification within 24
hours, before or after an evidentiary test at any level.
The 0.20 performance verification solution should not
be used routinely for this purpose." (emphasis added)

Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 3.
The State in it's briefing does not explain why ISPFS placed the word "approximately"
in 5.1.1 and why in 5.1.1 there is the phrase "and/or". This language is not consistent with 5.1.3
where the word "or" is used in reference to the 0.08 and 0.20 solution. The SOP does not state
that a 0.08 performance verification within 24 hours satisfies the requirement for an
excessive breath test.

This point is consistent with the e-mails noted above.

The SOP

specifically indicates that a 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for
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performance verification within 24 hours at any evidentiary test level. SOP 5.1.4.1. The
highlighted language above must mean something. The State wants to read something into the
SOP which is simply not there. The reason that ISPFS uses a 0.08 and a 0.20 solution is for the
benefit oflinearity. Linearity is for the benefit of testing an unknown sample (the driver's breath)
against a known sample which is the performance verification solution. Section 5.1.4 is just an
additional provision for a monthly 0.20 solution calibration and has nothing to do with the actual
breath sample testing with a driver.
Henry's Law, which is the scientific law that these breath testing machines are based on
supports Mr. Besaw's argument regarding breath testing in this particular circumstance. Henry's
Law describes the mechanism of exchange in the lungs which is influenced by physiological
factors. Henry's Law directly explains the volume of alcohol in the simulator's vapor. Henry's
Law states that in an enclosed system, at any given temperature, the concentration of a volatile
substance in the air above a fluid is proportional to the concentration of the volatile substance in
the fluid. In this circumstance, Mr. Besaw's breath sample is unknown while the liquid solution
is known and therefore the language and meaning of the SOP supports Mr. Besaw's argument.
Why exactly would the ISPFS note anything about performance verifications using a 0.20
within 24 hours if in fact it never had to be used with excessive breath samples? Why make any
reference to 0.20 at all for the 24 hour performance verification? Why not simply say a 0.08
solution applies in all circumstances. The State's position flies in the face of the idea oflinearity
and the whole reason for multiple solutions levels (i.e. 0.04; 0.08; 0.20) used in performance
verification. State's Motion Hearing Exhibit 12.
APPELLANT' S REPLY BRlEF
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Just the words themselves "performance verification" support Mr. Besaw's position.
When there is a solution change at the beginning or end of the month, there is no "verification"
to be made because there is no breath sample to be tested. There is a calibration of the machine
to make sure that it registers correctly a 0.08 and 0.20 but there is no "performance" being
verified. If in fact the performance verification using a 0.20 solution was not required for
excessive tests, why put extra language in the SOP that just causes confusion? If nothing else,
this SOP could be considered vague which does not meet the "standard" requirements ofLC. §
18-8004(4).
Mr. Besaw has met his burden with regard to the failure of the operator to do a
performance verification within 24 hours using the 0.20 solution with breath samples that were
in excess of 0.20. The officer used a 0.08 solution for an excessive breath test.
B.
THE 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SOP
The video is Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 7, hereinafter known as Exhibit 7. At
02:31:01 on Exhibit 7, Mr. Besaw was specifically noted as being arrested by the ISP officer. The
start of the ALS advisory was at 02:37: 15 and it ended at 02:40: 10 based on the audio/video that
is part of this record as Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw inquires at 02:40:13
about his Class A driver's license and the trooper provided misinformation at 02:40: 16 regarding
this issue. Motion Hearing T. at p. 91, 11 6-25.
There is boilerplate language on the probable affidavit that states as follows: "Defendant
was tested for alcohol concentrations, drugs or other intoxicating substances.
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was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 and 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the
standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement." (emphasis added)
R. at p. 10. There is no longer a Department of Law Enforcement so this boilerplate language is
not helpful in the analysis of whether the arresting officer complied with the requirements ofI.C.
§ 18-8002A, I.C. § 18-8004(4) and the standards and methods ofISPFS.
In Exhibit 7, the trooper did not bother to turn on the video for the backseat until after Mr.
Besaw's breath test was completed. This is his common practice not to video record the breath
test.
The magistrate and the District Court simply disregarded all ofthe distracting contacts that
were made and the common sense that should be applied here. If a trooper is talking to other law
enforcement officers, passengers or people that arrive later, his focus and senses are going to be
on those individuals and not on someone who is sitting below his eyesight, handcuffed sitting
inside the police car in the backseat. This is not a circumstance in which Mr. Besaw's feet were
outside the vehicle and he was facing towards the outside of the car. According to the trooper,
he was seated in the vehicle with his feet forward. Motion Hearing T. at p. 92, 11 14-18.
Also note, Mr Besaw's three samples (.219, insufficient, .201) are at the outer limit of the
0.02 collation factor. SOP § 6.2.2.2. In addition, the Court can note the 0.08 performance
verification checks that were noted on the log for January of2011. Defendant's Motion Hearing
Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw's 0.08 performance verification noted a .073/.073. The one done prior to
that on January 6, 2011, noted a .072/.073 for solution lot #10802. For the simulator solution lot
#10802, the State developed a Certificate of Approval setting the target range for the 0.08
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solution. The target range for solution lot #10802 is ".072 to .088 grams of ethyl alcoholl21 0
liters of vapor". Attached to this Brief as Exhibit B is the State's Certificate of Approval. The
performance verification checks regarding this solution are at the lowest end of the range. The
check done with the 0.08 solution on January 4, 2011, shows a .074/.075 solution test.
Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 4. The solution results were not outside the range, but there
is a question as to the viability of this particular solution lot. Combine this solution lot problem
with the range ofMr. Besaw's breath samples, .219, insufficient, and .201 and the Court can
suspect that the trooper failed to comply with the SOP §§ 6.1.4,6.1.4.1. and 6.1.4.3 2• The Court
has to determine that under the circumstances something was missed by the trooper because of
his distractions with the other police officers, the passenger, and the wife of the passenger who
arrived on the scene prior to breath testing being completed. The trooper could have video taped
Mr. Besaw in the backseat during the blow sequence, but he choose not to. The trooper could
have gone to the Nez Perce County jail to have the breath test done in an enclosed environment;
he choose not to.

2

The SOP states:
"6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert for any event that might influence
the accuracy of the breath alcohol test.
6.1.4.1 The Operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth alcohol as indicated by the testing
instrument. If mouth alcohol is suspected or indicated, the Operator should being another 15minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequence.
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute monitoring period, the officer
should look at results of the duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2."
Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 4.
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Mr. Besaw does not have the burden to come forward and prove anything about burping,
belching, or the like. He simply has to show that the observation period was not complied with.
The Court knows he was eating a hamburger shortly before breath testing was started, and he was
drinking alcohol. Hamburgers and alcohol lead to gas in the stomach; this is just common sense.
Once again, there does not need to be a Homer Simpson type belch for there to be burping and
the like in this sort of circumstance.
The Court should find that there was not a proper observation period. With this Court's
decision, the Court can instruct these officers to video the blow sequence when they have the
capability and to take the drivers to an enclosed environment for the benefit of the driver and the
observing officer. The Court can send a message to arresting officers who decide to do breath
testing out in the field. The trooper in this case could have called for Lewiston Police Department
back up since they did not want to leave him alone. Back up Lewiston Police could have fended
off passengers, wives of passengers and any other distraction. The Court should find that there
was not a proper observation period and Mr. Besaw's breath test should have been suppressed.
3.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO FIND A LACK OF STANDARDS
IN BREATH TESTING AS REQUIRED BY IDAHO CODE § 18-8004(4)

The State calls the argument made from Appellate's Brief pp. 31-40 a "diatribe" but does
acknowledge that the SOPs were changed because trial courts were not giving the State the
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decisions that they wanted. State's Brief at p. 6, FN 13 . The State does not address section 3 of
Mr. Besaw's first brief other than calling it a "diatribe." However, the Court should consider that
ISPFS has not complied with the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). Idaho Code Section 188002A(7)( d) specifically notes as grounds for vacating a license suspension: "The tests for alcohol
concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace
officer were not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4) Idaho
Code ... ".
The State did not deny in it's responding brief that the SOP and "breath testing standards"
were changed as a result of the reasons set out in the emails that were made part of this record.
R. at pp. 29-141. Emails were provided by the Idaho State police in response to a Freedom of
Information Request regarding why the changes were made to the SOP. R. at pp. 70, 198,229230.
The State does not address Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378,
223 P.3d 761 (Ct. App. 2009). Judge Lansing specifically indicated in her dissent that if the ISP
breath standards were not mandatory, then they could not be any sort of standard at all. In
addition, the State fails to address the holding in State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct.
App. 1998) and its analysis ofIdaho Code Section 18-8004(4).

"Because Besaw does not link his diatribe about the amendments to the standard operating procedures
to any relevant legal standards (Appellant's briefpp. 31-40), the state will respond only by noting that
altering the procedures was a perfectly legitimate exercise where trial courts had given those procedures
unexpected interpretations or where reliable BAC testing was being suppressed due to minor oversights
that did not actually effect the reliability of the testing."
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The State's basic position is that ISP can set anything as a standard, and the courts and
drivers in the State have to accept this position. The State's position is that ISP could issue a
single page, one sentence standard saying that "Whatever ISPFS says goes. Trust us, we're the
police." End of standard.
The August 20,2010, SOP's Scope Section states: "Following all the recommendations
of this external procedure will establish the scientific validity and set the unquestioned
foundational admissibility of the breath alcohol test." (emphasis added) See R. at p. 563. ISPFS
decided that what it writes would be "unquestioned" despite what all the case law holds regarding
what a driver can challenge. Please note all the deletions that occurred to the SOP on August 27,
201 O,just a scant seven days after the new SOP was put into effect4 . Defendant's Motion Hearing
Exhibit 3 at p. 50f21.
The November 1, 2010, SOP under "Scope" sets out: "Following all the
recommendations ofthis external procedure will establish the scientific validity of the breath

alcohol test. Failure to meet all the recommendations within this procedure does not disqualifY
the breath test." (emphasis added) Defendant's Exhibit 3 at p. 7 of21. The ISPFS has determined
that the SOP is just a "recommendation" that can be explained away by some BTS. The State
does not explain why there was any scientific need for changes to the SOP and the long standing
use ofBTS manuals as standards. The State does not cite to any case law in it's responsive brief

4

The SOP states: "Deletions and/or additions to section 2,4.3.3,4.4.1,4.4.3,4.4.5,4.6.1.1,5.1.2,
5.1.4,5.1.4.1,5.1.5,5.2.4,5.2.5,6,6.2.1,6.2.3,6.2.4,7, 7.1, 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.1.2.2, 7.1.3, 7.1.4, 7.1.5,
8." Defendant's Motion Hearing Exhibit 3, at p. 50f21.
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regarding this issue.
In Masterson v. Idaho Department o/Transportation,. 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct.
App. 2010), the Court looked at the Intoxilyzer 5000 and 5000EN manuals and noted the internal
parts and technology utilized by the two instruments were different.

The Court used the

Intoxilyzer 5000 and 5000EN manuals as a part of it's analysis of standards while noting the
inconsistencies between the SOP and the manuals.
In Hubbard v. Department o/Transportation, 152 Id. 879,276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012),
the Court quoted Gibbar v. State o/Idaho, Department o/Transportation, 143 Id. 937,155 P.3d
1176, (Ct. App. 2006):
"In Gibbar, we interpreted Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7)(c) and (d) 'as
permitting (administrative license suspension) petitioners to challenge the
results of their BAC tests by proving that the testing equipment was
inaccurate or was not functioning properly because the State has adopted
procedures that do not ensure accuracy and property functioning.' Gibbar,
143 Id. at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186."
At p. 755.
The Court went on to note that in State v. Hartwig, 112 Id. 370, 732 P.2d 339 (Ct. App.
1987), the reliability and performance of the machine is still subject to challenge. Prior to August
20,2010, breath testing standards included the BTS Manual and SOP. The BTS manual had
different sections that dealt with the programming and functioning of the machine, the training
of the operators in the maintenance and the operation of breath testing devices.
The SOP Subsection 6.2 dated August 20,2010, states:
"A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples
taken during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks. The
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duplicate breath samples should be approximately two minutes apart to
allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination."
(emphasis original)
Now examined the SOP's 6.2 dated November 1,2010, which states:
"A complete breath test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken
during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks. The duplicate
breath samples should be approximately two minutes apart, or more, for
the ASIII and the CS20 to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth
alcohol contamination. " (emphasis original)
There is a difference with a distinction between these two SOPs and the language noted.
The e-mail generated by Eric Moody to Mr Gammette on September 2, 2010, notes that during
oral argument, two attorneys argued the two minute separation between two breath test results
(SOP 6.2) do not occur with the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. R. at p. 33. Mr. Moody follows up and
notes that the Intoxilyzer 5000EN does not have this two minute wait period but the Alcosensor
III and the Lifeloc FC 20 do. R. at p. 33. He inquiries as to whether this SOP 6.2 only deals with
the Alcosensor III and the Lifeloc FC 20 but not the Intoxilyzer 5000.
As of August 20,2010, there would not have been one Intoxilyzer 5000 or one Intoxilyzer
5000EN in the State ofIdaho that complied with the two minute wait period because the machines
are not programmed for the two minute wait.
In November of 2010, ISPFS added the language regarding the Alcosensor III and the
Lifeloc FC 20 to Section 6.2 because that is the way these machines are programmed. These
machines are programmed for the two minute wait because that is what the international and
national standards are for breath testing. The International Organization of Legal Metrology
(OIML) is a worldwide, intergovernmental organization whose primary aim is to harmonize
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regulation and metrological controls applied by national metrological serVIces or related
organizations of its member states such as the United States of America. The United States
organization is the National Safety Council on alcohol and other drugs. Both organizations
endorse a minimum of two samples taken not less than two or more than ten minutes apart. This
standard is cited by Dubowski on page 310 of his article, K.M. Dubowski, "Quality Assurance
in Breath Alcohol Analysis." Journal of Analytical Toxicology, Volume 18: pp. 306-311 (1994).
The State's brief does not describe scientific standards are or how a scientific standard can
be discretionary. Judge Lansing did not seem to think standards could be discretionary in her
dissent in Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 rd. 378, 223 P.3d, 761 (Ct. App.
2009). The State does not explain exactly how the standard regarding the 15 minute observation
period went from a mandatary monitoring period to a discretionary monitoring period, from
"must" to "should".
The State also does not cite to In Re Schroeder, 147 Id. 476, 210 P.3d 584 (Ct. App.
2009). This is the case that probably started ISP's journey to it's current SOP. The Court in In

Re Schroeder specifically noted that the SOP and the Intoxilyzer 5000 manual were in conflict
with respect to the circumstances in which the monitoring period must be restarted. The Court
indicated that Intoxilyzer 5000 manual governed because it was more specific:
"Here, the SOP is more general, for it applies to various breath testing
devices approved by the ISP, whereas the Intoxilyzer 5000 manual is
written exclusively for that instrument and is therefore less likely to have
been written in a way that might sacrifice specific detail for broad
app licabili ty."
At p. 480.
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One of the e-mail generated by Matthew Gammette to chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, breath
testing specialists and breath instrument operators specifically noted:
"The Idaho Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) contains the method to
follow in general. This manual has been revised and updated.
The 'training manuals' have been replaced by 'reference manuals.' Each
instrument series has a reference manual. We found that in a number of
cases the training manual and the SOP had conflicting information
and the courts were deciding which manual to use for interpretation.
In the revised manuals we have made it very clear that the SOP is the
document that should be referenced and the reference manuals are really
for the BTS or operator reference when working with the instrument
menus. We have tried to take out any conflicting wording. If we have
missed something, please let us know. The BTS and operators should be
very familiar with the SOP." (bold emphasis added) (underlining original)
R. at p. 31.
Because of the Schroeder case, ISPFS has dumbed down the standards to something that
is not based on "specific detail" and are just recommendations. There is no indication that there
was any scientific peer review of these new SOPs. The SOP does not meet the requirements of
the legislative history Judge Lansing noted in State v. Turbyfill, 2012 WL 4465773, FN 2.
ISPFS has violated the mandate from the legislature. ISPFS has simply made the breath
testing system so pliable that there are no standards that ISPFS cannot over come by sending
Jeremy Johnston or some breath testing specialist into to testifY. Why exactly is Mr. Gammette
asking chiefs of police, sheriffs, and prosecutors for input in developing "scientific standards" for
breath testing in the State ofIdaho? The State in it's responding brief does not answer why these
non-scientists were asked about setting scientific standards in the new SOP.
It does not take a scientist to figure out that discretionary language and "wiggle" words
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and vagueness do not amount to scientific standards that should be relied on by the courts. The
Court can also note another e-mail sent from Matthew Gammette to chiefs of police, prosecutors
and other "stakeholders" in which he notes that on August 27, 2010, ISPFS published a revision
1 of the Idaho Breath Testing SOP. He notes the release of revision 0 gave ISPFS the opportunity
to hear from prosecutors, etc., regarding the SOP. He thanks them for their comments and notes
that ISPFS is doing some "legal research" regarding sections of the SOP. R. at p. 32. Why
exactly are scientific standards being developed based on legal research? The legislature passed
I.C. § 18-8004(4) requiring valid scientific methods of breath testing. ISPFS has made rules that
weaken the breath testing standards so much that basically if the police get a result, it is
admissible. Therefore, ISPFS has taken this delegation of authority to an unconstitutional level.
If the Court upholds ISPFS' s actions with regard to breath testing "standards" in this state,
then the Court can only assume that ISPFS will continue to dumb down the standards until there
is just a single page SOP that says "What ISPFS say goes. Trust us, we're the police."
Mr. Besaw has tried to point out the flawed system used by ISPFS with regard to breath
testing in the State of Idaho. The e-mails that are found in Mr. Besaw's record show how ISPFS
develop its "standards" for breath testing. These standards are not compliant with forensic
SCIence.
There was a recently published book by the Committee on IdentifYing the Needs of the
Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council. Strengthening Forensic Science in the
United States: A Path Forward (2009). This book was generated as a result of Congress directing
the National Academy of Sciences to undertake a study regarding forensic science. Preface at p.
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XIX.

The book discusses: the fundamentals of scientific method as applies to forensic practice;

falsifiability and replication and peer review of scientific pUblications; the assessment offorensic
methods and technology; the collection and analysis of forensic data; and accuracy and error rates
of forensic analysis. The report for Congress noted the lack of standards. There was no
uniformity in certification of forensic practitioners or the accreditation of crime laboratories. At
p. 6. The study by the Congressional Committee determined the need for requirements for
measurement of error such as would be found in breath testing, noting that there are inherent
limitation of the measurement technique. A range of factors are present and can affect the
accuracy oflaboratory analysis. Such factors may include deficiencies in the reference materials
used in the analysis, equipment errors, environmental conditions that lay outside the range which
the method was validated, sample mix ups and contamination, transcription errors and more.
The report noted that with regard to breath testing that there has to be a confidence interval
for the range of breath testing that would supply a high probability of containing the true alcohol
level. At p. 117.
The report also criticizes forensic science laboratories that are administered by law
enforcement agencies. The report notes the forensic laboratories should be independent or
autonomous from law enforcement agencies. At pp. 183 - 184.
There is a specific notation regarding standards for quality control: "Standards provide
the foundation against which performance, reliability, and validity can be accessed. Adherence
to standards reduces biases, and proves consistency, and enhances the validity and reliability of
results. Standards reduce variability resulting from idiosyncratic tendencies of the individual
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examiner." At p. 201.
The report also notes that there are many scientific organizations that have set standards.
It cites to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). No where in this report to

Congress is there any indication that standards are set by way of "wiggle room", "vagueness", and
discretionary standards.

In this case, ISPFS violated the mandate of the statutory provision ofI.C. § 18-8004(4).
The ISPFS did not have the authority to enter into a wholesale change of breath standards from
mandatory to discretionary. The procedure used was improper, it was not based on scientific
standards. The SOP was based on what ISPFS gleaned would help in DUI cases and ALS
administrative hearings. The State's brief agrees. State's Brief at p. 6.
Please note that the Idaho Supreme Court has determined an action is capricious if it was
done without a rational basis. In American Law Association of Idaho/Nevada v. State, 142 Id.
544, 130 P.3d 1082 (2006), the Court found it was arbitrary if the agency action was done in
disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles.
What was the rational basis for making the SOP a discretionary document? There was a disregard
of scientific principles, facts and circumstances making the current SOP arbitrary.
The e-mails noted in this case make it clear that ISPFS failed to comply with the mandate
of I.e. § 18-8004(4). A substantial right of Mr. Besaw has been prejudiced, his ability to earn a
living by way of his CDL driver's license. Of course, Mr. Besaw's case has a wider application
to all drivers since the breath testing system is being challenged.
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CONCLUSION

The breath test results should have been suppressed. The field sobriety test should have
been suppressed. This Court is requested to direct the magistrate court on remand to suppress the
breath tests and field sobriety tests.
DATED this ~ day of December, 2012.
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP
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EXHIBIT A

718 P.2d 171
149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171,60 A.L.RAth 1103
(Cite as: 149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171)

p
Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.
The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner,
v.

The SlJPERIOR COTJRT of the State of Arizona,
In and For the COUNTY OF COCHISE, and the
Hon. James L. Riley, Division III, Respondent,
and
Frederick Andrew BLAKE, Real Party in Interest.
No. 18343-PR.
April 7,1986.
A special action was instituted by the State to
review an order of the respondent court dismissing
a DWI prosecution on ground that sobriety test
known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN, test
was insufficiently reliable to be considered in determining probable cause to arrest. The Court of
Appeals,
89 vacated dismissal of prosecution and remanded, and defendant
sought review. The Supreme Court, Feldman. 1..
held that: (1) HGN test was shown to be sufficiently reliable to be used in establishing probable
cause for arrest, and (2) HGN test satisfied Frye
test for admissibility of scientific evidence and was
admissible for limited purpose of corroborating
chemical sobriety tests.
Opinion affirmed as modified, dismissal vacated and case remanded.
West Headnotes

Page 1

Evidence helping to give reasonable suspicion
justifYing limited Terry stop is not required to pass
Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence.
ConstAmend.4.
Automobiles 48A €:=>349(2.1)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
Prosecution
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
In general.
(Formerly 48Ak349(2), 48Ak349)
Weaving of automobile in traffic lane was a
specific and articulable fact which justified investigative stop of automobile.

Automobiles 48A €:=>414
48A Automobiles
Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak4
k. Right to take sample or conduct
test; initiating procedure.
(Formerly 48Ak349)
Officer stopping motorist on suspicion that motorist is driving while intoxicated is entitled to conduct standard and reasonable tests to discover
whether motorist is in fact intoxicated if nothing in
initial stages of stop serves to dispel officer's suspicions.
4.

Criminal Law 110 €:::=388.1
Automobiles 48A €:=>349(6)
J0 Criminal Law

lOXVn Evidence
Competency in General
lOk38R Experiments and Tests; Scientific and Survey Evidence
Ok388. k. In general. [\10st

) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bailor
Deposit
k.

(Foill1erly 35k63.5(1»

Intoxication.

Cited
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(Formerly 48Ak349)
Stopping automobile and administering standard and reasonable tests to discover whether motorist is intoxicated is more analogous to a limited
Terry stop than to formal arrest; refusing to follow
Carlson. 677 .2d 10
ConsLAmend.4.

Automobiles 48A

~349(17)

Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest. Stop, or Inquiry; Bail or
Deposit
Conduct of Arrest, Stop,
or Inquiry
k. Detention, and
length and character thereof. )V10S1
(Formerly 48Ak349)
Roadside sobriety tests that do not involve long
delay or unreasonable intrusion may be justified by
officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific
and articulable facts, that driver is intoxicated.

Page 2

k. Evidence.
Evidence helping to establish probable cause to
arrest is not required to pass Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence.

Automobiles 48A ~422.1
48A Automobiles
Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak422 Conduct and Proof of Test; Foundation or Predicate
J k. In general.
(Formerly 48Ak422, 48Ak349)
Evidence established that "horizontal gaze nystagmus test" administered by trained officer was
sufficiently trustworthy to be used to help establish
probable cause to arrest for driving while intoxicated. AR.S. § 28-692;

Automobiles 48A ~349(6)

) Prosecution
Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry; Bailor

!v '

Automobiles 48A

~419

Automobiles
Evidence of Sobriety Tests
Grounds for Test
k. Grounds or cause; necessity
for arrest.
(Formerly 48Ak349)
Motorist's erratic driving, appearance and smell
of alcohol were specific and articulable facts giving
arresting officer sufficient grounds to administer
roadside sobriety tests.

Deposit
Intoxication.
(Formerly 48Ak349)
Defendant's erratic driving, fair perfonnance on
traditional sobriety tests, smell of alcohol on his
breath, his appearance and his score on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test were sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant for driving
under the influence. A.R.S. § 28-692.

Automobiles 48A ~41l
Arrest 35

~63.4(18)

Arrest
35I1 On Criminal Charges
Officers and Assistants, Arrest
Without Warrant
.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause

Automobiles
Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak41 k. In general.
(Formerly IIOk388)
Appropriate disciplines to consider in determ-
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ining whether horizontal gaze nystagmus test for intoxication meets general acceptance requirement of
Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence include behavioral psychology, highway safety and,
to a lesser extent, neurology and criminalistics.

Page 3

evidence of HGN test, however, is not admissible
to prove requisite blood alcohol level in absence of
a laboratory chemical analysis of blood, breath or
urine. A.R.S. § 28-692.
J

Automobiles 48A €=355(6)

Criminal Law 110 €=388.1

oCriminal Law
Evidence
Competency in General
Ok388 Experiments and Tests; Scientific and Survey Evidence
lOk381l. k. In general.
(Formerly 110k388(l), 110k388)
General acceptance requirement of Frye test
for admissibility of scientific evidence does not necessitate showing of universal acceptance of the reliability of scientific principle or procedure under
scrutiny.

Prosecution
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
k. Driving while intoxicated.

Mo~.l

Regardless of quality and abundance of other
evidence, driver may not be convicted of driving
under the influence without chemical analysis of
blood, breath or urine showing proscribed blood alcohol content. A.R.S. § 28-692, subd. B.

Automobiles 48A €=353(6)

Automobiles 48A €=411
48A Automobiles
48A1X Evidence of Sobriety Tests
1 ] k. In general.
(Formerly 11 Ok388)
"Horizontal gaze nystagmus test" for intoxication satisfies Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence.

Automobiles 48A €=422.1

Evidence of Sobriety Tests
Conduct and Proof of Test: Foundation or Predicate
48Ak4221 k. In general.
(Formerly 48Ak422, 110k388)
Testimony describing results of horizontal gaze
nystagmus, or HGN, test administered to defendant
is admissible on issue of defendant's blood alcohol
level if proper foundation as to techniques used and
testing officer's ability to use techniques is laid;
on,n'kk

Presumptions

and

Burden of

Proof
k. Driving while intoxicated.
(Formerly 48Ak353)
Statutory presumption that driver having blood
alcohol of 0.10 percent or more by weight is presumed to be under influence of intoxicating liquor
must rest on chemical analysis of defendant's blood,
urine, breath or other bodily substance and may not
rest on blood alcohol level estimate derived from
horizontal gaze nystagmus test. A.R.S. § 28-692,
subd. E.

Automobiles 48A €=411
48/\ Automobiles
Evidence of Sobriety Tests
1 k. In general.
(Formerly IIOk388)
Results of horizontal gaze nystagmus test are
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admissible only to corroborate challenged accuracy
of results of chemical tests for blood alcohol level
and are not admissible in any criminal case as direct independent evidence to quantify blood alcohol
content. AR.S. § 28-692.

**172 *270 Alan K. Polley, Cochise Co. Atty. by
Dennis L. Lusk, Deputy Co. Atty., Bisbee, for petitioner.
Robert F. Arentz, Cochise Co. Public Defender,
Bisbee, for real party in interest.
Pima Co. Public Defender by Carla G. Ryan, Asst.
Public Defender, Tucson, Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa Co. Atty. by Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa Co.
Atty., and Patrick Sullivan, Deputy Co. Atty.,
Phoenix, Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty. by
Frederick S. Dean, Tucson City Atty., and R. William Call and Elisabeth C. Sotelo, Asst. City Attys.,
Tucson, Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Robert K.
Corbin, Atty. Gen., and Samuel Ruiz, Asst. Atty.
Gen., Phoenix, Steven D. Neely, Pima Co. Atty. by
Steven D. Neely, Pima County Atty., and John R.
Gustafson and Sandra M. Hansen, Deputy Co. Attys., Tucson, for amicus curiae.
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duced in evidence at trial.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of March 18, 1985,
Frederick Blake was driving a car on State Route
92, south of Sierra Vista. He was stopped by Officer Hohn who had observed the vehicle meandering within its lane, and who therefore suspected
Blake of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Noting, also, that Blake's appearance and breath indicated intoxication, the officer had Blake perform
a battery of six field sobriety tests, including the
horizontal gaze
(HGN) test.
is an involuntary jerking of the eyeball. The jerking
may be aggravated by central nervous system depressants such as alcohol or barbiturates. See THE
MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1980 (14th ed. 1982). Horizontal gaze
is the inability of the eyes to maintain visual
fixation as they are turned to the side.
In the HGN test the driver is asked to cover one
eye and focus the other on an object (usually a pen)
held by the officer at the driver's eye level. As the
officer moves the object gradually out of the
driver's field of vision toward his ear, he watches
the driver's eyeball to detect involuntary jerking.
The test is repeated with the other eye. By observing (1) the inability of each eye to track movement smoothly, (2) pronounced
imum deviation and (3) onset of the
at
an angle less than 45 degrees in relation to the center point, the officer can estimate whether the
driver's blood alcohol content (BAC) exceeds the
legal limit of .10 percent. Officer Hohn had been
trained in the use of the HGN test and certified to
administer it by the Arizona Law Enforcement Officer Advisory Council (ALEOC) pursuant to
4]

1. whether the horizontal gaze nystagmus test
is sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause
for arrest for DUI, and

**173 *271 2. whether horizontal gaze nystagmus test results are sufficiently reliable to be intro-

Blake's performance of the first three standard
field sobriety tests was "fair" and did not amount to
probable cause to arrest Blake for DUI. As a result
of the HGN test, however, the officer estimated that
Blake had a BAC in excess of 10 percent. Blake's
performance on the last two tests strengthened his
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conclusion. Having also smelled a strong odor of
alcohol on Blake's breath and noticed Blake's
slurred speech and bloodshot, watery and dilated
eyes, Officer Hohn then arrested Blake on a charge
of felony DUI in violation of A.R.S. § 28-692.
Hohn then transported Blake to the police station
where he administered an intoxilyzer test which
showed that Blake had a BAC of .163 percent.
Blake made two motions to the trial court: to
dismiss the prosecution for lack of probable cause
to arrest and to preclude the admission of testimony
of the HGN test and its results at trial. At the evidentiary hearing on these two motions the state
presented evidence regarding the principles and use
of HGN testing from Dr. Marcelline Bums, a research psychologist who studies the effect of alcohol on behavior, Sgt. Richard Studdard of the Los
Angeles Police Department, and Sgt. Jeffrey
Raynor and Officer Robert Hohn of the Arizona
Department of Public Safety.
Dr. Bums, Director the Southern California Research Institute (SCRI or Institute) testified that the
Institute had received research contracts from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) to develop the best possible field sobriety
tests. The result of this research was a three-test
battery, which included the walk and tum, the oneleg stand, and the HGN. This battery could be administered without special equipment. required no
more than five minutes in most cases, and resulted
in 83 percent accuracy in determining BAC above
and below .10 percent. Dr. Bums testified that all
field sobriety tests help the police officers to estimate BAC: The HGN test is based on the known
principle that certain toxic substances, including alcohol, cause
The SCRI study found
HGN to be the best single index of intoxication, because it is an involuntary response. BAC can even
be estimated from the angle of onset of the involuntary jerking: 50 degrees**174 *272 minus the angle
of the gaze at the onset of eye oscillation equals the
BAC:
Dr. Bums testified that the HGN test had
been accepted as valid by the highway safety field,
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including the ~lITSA, Finnish researchers, state
agencies such as the California Highway Patrol,
Arizona Highway Patrol, Washington State Police,
and numerous city agencies. Finally, the state
offered in evidence an HGN training manual developed by the NHTSA for its nationwide program
to train law enforcement officers. Both the manual
and training program were based on the Institute's
studies.
1. Thus, nystagmus at 45° corresponds
to a blood alcohol content (BAC) of
0.05%: nystagmus at 40° to a BAC of
0.10%; nystagmus at 35° to a BAC of
0.15%; and nystagmus at 30° > » to a
BAC of 0.20%. See 1 R. ERWIN. DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES
(3d ed. 1985) ~ 8.l5A[1]. At BACs above
0.20%, a person's eyes may not be able to
follow a moving object. Tharp, Gaze Nystagmus As A Roadside Sobriety Test 6
(unpublished
paper
available
through
SCRI). It should be noted however that
when officers administer the test they do
not necessarily measure the angle of onset:
instead they look for three characteristics
of high BAC: inability of smooth pursuit,
distinct jerkiness at maximum deviation
and onset of jerkiness prior to 45° > ».
We do not address the admissibility of
quantified BAC estimates based on angle
of onset of nystagmus.
Sgt. Studdard is currently a supervlsor 111
charge of DDI enforcement for the City of Los
Angeles and a consultant to NHTSA on field sobriety testing. Based on his field work administering
the HGN test and his participation in double blind
studies at the Institute, he testified that the accuracy
rate of the HGN test in estimating whether the level
of BAC exceeds .10 percent is between 80 and 90
percent. According to Studdard the margin of inaccuracy is caused by the fact that certain drugs, such
as barbiturates, cause the same effects as alcohol.
\Ve take notice, however, that nystagmus may also
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indicate a number of neurological conditions, and
the presence of any of these would also affect the
accuracy of the HGN-based estimate of blood alcohol content. See infra at 177. Both Sgt. Studdard
and Sgt. Raynor, who currently administers the
HGN training program for the State of Arizona,
testified that the HGN test is especially useful in
detecting violations where a driver with BAC over
.10 percent is able to pull himself together sufficiently to pass the traditional field sobriety tests
and thus avoid arrest and subsequent chemical testing.
Sgt. Raynor testified that the traditional field
sobriety tests are not sensitive enough to detect
dangerously impaired drivers with BAC between
.10 percent and .14 percent and that the police officers thus must permit them to drive on.
Sgt.
Raynor also testified as to the rigor and requirements of the Arizona training and certification program.
It is claimed that three times as many
drivers on the road have BACs in the .10%
to .14% range than in the .15% to .19%
range, but those arrested are in the latter
group, 2 to I. Anderson, Schweitz &
Snyder, Field Evaluation o[ a Behavioral
Test Battery jor DWI, U.S. Department of
Transportation
Rep.
No.
DOT
HS-806-475 (1983) (included in state's
evidence).

At the close of the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court concluded that HGN represented a new scientific principle and was therefore subject to the
Flye standard of admissibility.
The court
Stafes.
Fed. 101
ruled the HGN test did not satisfy Flye, was therefore unreliable, and could not form the basis of
probable cause. The court granted Blake's motion to
dismiss.
The state filed a petition for special action F~ c
the court of appeals, which accepted jurisdiction
and granted relief. The court of appeals noted that

III
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the Frye standard applies only to the admissibility
of evidence at trial, not to probable cause for arrest.
It stated that probable cause requires only reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed the offense. 149 Ariz. at 271, 718 P .2d
at 173. The court of appeals found HGN sufficiently reliable to **175 *273 provide probable
cause. ld 149 Ariz. at 273, 718 P.2d at 175. The
court of appeals held that the HGN test satisfied
Flye and would be admissible, except that there
was insufficient foundation as to the arresting officer's proficiency in administering the test. ld The
court vacated the trial court's order and remanded
for further proceedings.
In Arizona, relief formerly obtained
by writs of mandamus or prohibition is
now obtained by "Special Action". See

DISCUSSION
I. Was Blake's Arrest Legal?
Blake contends that the trial court correctly dismissed the prosecution after ruling that the HGN
test did not meet the Flye standard. Because probable cause was established by "an unreliable test.
the HGN, which has not had its trustworthiness corroborated," the arrest was illegal. and later discovered evidence, such as the intoxilyzer results,
cannot be used in evidence.
The Pima County Public Defender, appearing
amicus, argues that any roadside sobriety test is a
full search and must, therefore, be founded on probable cause. Because the arresting officer testified
that he did not have probable cause to arrest even
after the performance of the traditional field tests,
amicus argues that he did not have the requisite
probable cause to administer the HGN test. For this
cont~ntion amicus relies on
l' Carlson
.2d
O.
1984 in which the Colorado
Supreme Court held that "roadside sobriety testing
constitutes a full 'search' in the constitutional sense
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of that tenn and therefore must be supported by
probable cause."
] For the reasons set forth below we agree
with both of the state's arguments. First, administration of roadside, perfonnance-based sobriety tests
does not require probable cause. Second, neither
evidence that fonns the basis for probable cause nor
that required to raise a reasonable suspicion need be
tested under the Frye rule.
Did the Stop Followed by Field Sobriety Tests Violate the Fourth Amendment?
The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right to be secure
against umeasonable search and seizure. This guarantee requires arrests to be based on probable cause
and pennits limited investigatory stops based only
on an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal
} gg

gg9
Such stops are pennitted although they constitute seizures under the fourth
amendment. See
1)83.
Officer Hohn testified that he stopped Blake because Blake's car had
been weaving in its lane, and he suspected the
driver to be under the influence of alcohol. We find
that Blake's weaving was a specific and articulable
fact which justified an investigative stop. The next
question is whether this reasonable suspicion also
justified compelling Blake to perfonn roadside
sobriety tests.
An investigatory stop may include a safety
frisk for weapons as well as questions to dispel the
officer's reasonable suspicions.
gg
gf\o. While all this may be done
without the probable cause required for arrest, an
arrest may occur before the moment the police officer either accuses the suspect of a specific offense
or fonnally takes him into custody. It may be
deemed to have occurred substantially before that
time, perhaps during questioning. See Stafe 1
('gar
440"
579. 586 (
In this case we confront the difficult area
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between the physical stop of defendant and the articulation of the charge. We must draw the line,
however fine, between investigatory questioning
that is pennissible before the arrest and acts permissible only after the charges have been made. See
59
487.
688. 697 1984) (at scene of fatal car accident, field sobriety tests were investigatory). In a
sense this is a **176 *274 question of first impression. Our cases in the past have presumed that roadside sobriety tests are incident to the stop, and that
chemical tests, such as the intoxilyzer, are incident
to the

680
Any examination of a person with a view to
discovering evidence of guilt to be used in a prosecution of a criminal action is a search. The fourth
amendment does not prohibit all warrantless
searches, only those that are umeasonable. State
1.

( J

pem1its a warrantless search supported only by
reasonable suspicion depends on the nature of both
the governmental interest and the intrusion into a
citizen's personal security. State v. Grijalva, supra.
Thus, the necessity of the search is balanced against
the invasion of the privacy of the citizen that the
search entails. Jd
We have held that the state has a compelling
interest m removing drunk drivers from the highThe legislature has recognized the threat of drunk drivers and enacted A.R.S.
~ 28~692(B), which makes it per se illegal to drive
with a BAC of .10 percent or more, a level at which
virtually everyone's driving ability is impaired. Jd.
Against this compelling state interest we are to
weigh the substantiality of the intrusion or inconvenience of roadside sobriety tests that measure
physical perfonnance of the suspected drunk driver.
In Terry the Supreme Court stated:
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We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.

We think Terry is on point: the threat to
public safety posed by a person driving under the
influence of alcohol is as great as the threat posed
by a person illegally concealing a gun. If nothing in
the initial stages of the stop serves to dispel the
highway patrol officer's reasonable suspicion. fear
for the safety of others on the highway entitles him
to conduct a "carefully limited search" by observing the driver's conduct and performance of
standard, reasonable tests to discover whether the
driver is drunk. The battery of roadside sobriety
tests is such a limited search. The duration and atmosphere of the usual traffic stop make it more
analogous to a so-called Teny stop than to a formal
arrest. See
refuse to adopt the rule of People v.
We hold, therefore, that roadside sobriety tests that do not involve long delay or unreasonable intrusion, although searches under the fourth
amendment, may be justified by an officer's reasonable suspicion (based on specific, articulable facts)
that the driver is intoxicated. We further find that
Blake's erratic driving, appearance and smell of alcohol were specific, articulable facts which gave
the officer sufficient grounds to administer roadside
sobriety tests, including HGN.
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Is the HGN Test Sufficiently Reliable to Establish
Probable Cause for Arrest?
Observing Blake's performance of the tests, the
officer put him under arrest and took him to the station for chemical testing **177 *275 for BAC.
Blake argues the arrest was invalid for lack of probable cause and that the information obtained by
later chemical testing is therefore inadmissible.
Probable cause may not rest on mere suspicion but neither must it rest on evidence sufficient
to convict.
In dealing with probable cause ... we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable [people], not legal technieians, act.

Information sufficient to raise a suspicion of criminal behavior by definition need not pass tests of admissibility under our rules of evidence. It has long been
the rule that an arresting officer has probable cause
if he has reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a responsible person to believe an offense has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it. See
69
1 1
now must determine
(1
whether the HGN test provides reasonably trustworthy information. sufficient to lead a reasonable
person to believe a driver is intoxicated.
Nystagmus is a well known physiological phenomenon, defined and described in such tomes as
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
(1980), DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL
DICTIONARY (25th ed. 1974), 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITAN'NICA. MICROPAEDIA (15th ed.
1974) and STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (5th Lawyer's ed. 1982). That it can be caused
by ingestion of alcohol is also accepted in medical
literature.
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Jerk
... is characterized by a slow
drift, usually away from the direction of gaze,
followed by a quick jerk of recovery in the direction of gaze. A motor disorder, it may be congenital or due to a variety of conditions affecting the
brain, including ingestion of drugs such as alcohol and barbiturates, palsy of lateral or vertical
gaze, disorders
the vestibular apparatus and
brainstem and cerebellar
THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS
AND THERAPY 1980 (14th ed. 1982) (emphasis
added). Even before the Institute's federal grant, the
relationship between BAC and nystagmus was recognized by some highway safety agencies as a tool
to detect those illegally driving under the influence
of alcohol. Burns & Moskowitz, Psychophysical
Tests for DWJ Arrest, U.S. Department of Transportation Rep. No. DOT-HS-802-424 (1977), at
80. In its federally funded study, the Institute discovered that of the six most sensitive field sobriety
tests being used by the police around the country,
the HGN was the most reliable and precise indicator of the proscribed level ofBAC. Jd. at 39.
Judicial assessment of whether the arresting officer had probable cause need not rest, however, on
whether the information relied on is universally
known. The arresting officer is entitled to draw specific reasonable inferences from the facts in light of
his own experience, as well as the transmitted experience of other police officers. See Terry v Ohio,
supra, STate
)097
(
Hohn's experience included training in DUI detection and field administrations of the HGN test. His
administration of the test did not cause him to arrest
everyone he tested. He testified that although he
had logged over 150 field administrations of the
test battery, he had made only six DUI arrests. On
the evening of Blake's arrest Officer Hahn had
made between eight and twelve DUI stops, had given the battery to all, but found probable cause to arrest only Blake.
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personal experience is the result of the transmitted
experience of countless other trained highway
safety officers. Dr. Burns testified that in a survey
of the first 800 officers trained, over 80 percent
rated HGN as the most sensitive roadside sobriety
test and found the test battery to have increased
their accuracy in recognizing the impaired driver.
Sgt. Studdard, who estimated**178 *276 he had
administered the HGN test on the street to several
thousand individuals, had seen only one or two
people in whom the nystagmus did not correlate to
the BAC. He testified that he had trained numerous
agencies in Arizona, Michigan, New York, Arkansas, Louisiana, North Carolina and Maryland in the
use of HGN. He found that the officers' accuracy
rate in determining BAC was between 80 and 90
percent.

J We conclude that the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing regarding the reliability of the HGN test establishes that in the hands of
a trained officer the test is reasonably trustworthy
and may be used to help establish probable cause to
arrest. We further find that Blake's driving, his "fair
performance" on the traditional sobriety tests, the
smell of alcohol on his breath, his appearance and
his score on the HGN test could lead a reasonable
person to believe Blake was driving with a BAC in
excess of .J 0 percent in violation of A.R.S. §
28-692. Taken together there was more than suffievidence to establish probable

admissibility under Frye was a prerequisite for
evidence used to establish probable cause, we vacate the trial court's order of dismissal of the case
and remand the matter for trial.

2. Are HGN Test Results Admissible Evidence?
Our holding that when administered by properly trained and certified police officers the HGN
test is sufficiently reliable to be used to establish
probable cause does not mean the test results may

Testimony also showed that Officer Hohn's
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be admitted in evidence on the question of guilt or
innocence. In Fuenning v. Superior Court, supra,
we held that if a defendant challenges the intoxilyzer test results, the conduct that provided probable
cause becomes relevant to the question of the accuracy of the chemical analysis which allegedly
showed that the driver's BAC exceeded .10 percent,
and thus may be admissible. We stated such admissible testimony might include "the manner in
which he was driving [and] the manner in which he
perfonned the field sobriety tests .... "
at
599.680 P
at 30.
Unless the results of the HGN test are also admissible under our rules of evidence, when a driver
challenges the chemical test results, the state may
find itself in the position of being able to support
the arrest with the results of the traditional field
sobriety tests, but not the more probative HGN test
results. This result is not unique.
Much evidence of real and substantial probative
value goes out on considerations irrelevant to its
probative weight but relevant to possible misunderstanding or misuse by the jury.

69

()nifcd

The "Frye Rule n
The HGN test is a different type of test from
balancing on one leg or walking a straight line because it rests almost entirely upon an assertion of
scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common
knowledge. Different rules therefore apply to detennine its admissibility. See

to this question
admissibility that we now address ourselves.
Rules of evidence are aimed at preventing jury
confusion, prejudice and undue consumption of
time and trial resources. Slate 1".
86
(1 J);
403.
Scientific evidence is a source of particular

judicial caution. Because "science" is often accepted in our society as synonymous with truth, there
is a substantial risk that the jury may give undue
weight to such evidence. M. UDALL & 1. LIVERMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 102 (2d ed. 1982).
If a technique has an "enonnous effect in resolving
completely a matter in controversy," **179 *277 it
must be demonstrably reliable before it is admissible. Id.
Before expert opinion evidence based on a novel scientific principle can be admitted, the rule of
Flye v. United States, supra, requires that the theory relied on be in confonnity with a generally accepted explanatory theory. See
P.2d
The purpose of this requirement is to assure the reliability of the testimony.
Because HGN is a new technique based upon scientific principles, its reliability is to be measured
against the Frye standard. Id. Frye screens out unreliable scientific evidence because under its standard
it is not enough that a qualified expert, or even
several experts, testify that a particular scientific
technique is valid; Frye imposes a special burden-the technique must be generally accepted
bv the relevant scientific community.
Symposium 011 Science and Rules of Evidence,
99 F.R.D. 187, 189 (1984) (emphasis in original).
Recognizing that judges and juries are not always
in a position to assess the validity of the claims
made by an expert witness before making findings
of fact, Frye guarantees that reliability will be assessed by those in the best position to do so: members of the relevant scientific field who can dispassionately study and test the new theory.

If the scientific principle has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,
evidence resulting from its application is admissible, "subject to a foundational showing that the expert was qualified, the technique was properly used,
and the results were accurately recorded."
To determine
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whether the HGN test satisfies the test of general
acceptance we must (1) identify the appropriate scientific community whose acceptance of the nystagmus principles and validity of the HGN test is required, and (2) determine whether there is general
acceptance of both the scientific principle and the
technique applying the theory. See Symposium, 99
F.R.D. at 193; M. UDALL & 1. LIVERJv1ORE,
supra. The admissibility of HGN test results under
the Frye standard is an issue of first impression.
Our search has not brought to light any reported
American case law ruling on the issue.
FN4. We have discovered two cases that
discuss the admissibility of nystagmus on
the question of BAC.
State v. Nagel, Ohio
Ct.App. No. 2100, filed Feb. 5, 1986. In
Loomis the superior court held the municipal court had erred in allowing the officer to testify as to his opinion based on
training, experience and the number of
times he had given the test. The court in
dictum then stated that it would also have
been error to admit the officer's testimony
as an expert opinion because the state had
failed to demonstrate that the nystagmus
test was reliable by showing it had gained
general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs, as required by Frye. In
Nagel, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's admission of testimony on
HGN. Rejecting appellant's argument that
it was inadmissible because the testifying
officer was not an expert and there was no
scientific basis for the HGN test, the court
held nystagmus is objectively observable
and requires no expert interpretation.
The state argues that the relevant scientific
community is that of law enforcement and highway
safety agencies and behavioral psychologists. Public defender amicus contends that we should disregard these sources and argues that the HGN phe-
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nomenon requires assessment by scientists in the
fields of neurology, ophthalmology, pharmacology
and criminalistics. It claims that narrowing the field
deprives the general scientific community of the
time needed to evaluate the procedure before it is
examined by the legal community. We agree that
validation studies must be performed by scientists
other than those who have professional and personal interest in the outcome of the evaluation.
1
99.
We believe, however, that the relevant scientific community that must be shown to have accepted
a new scientific procedure is often self-selecting.
Scientists who have no interest in a new scientific
principle are unlikely to evaluate it, even if a court
determines they are part of a relevant scientific
community. The HGN test measures **180 *278 a
behavioral phenomenon: specifically the effects of
alcohol on one aspect of human behavior, the
movement of the eye. Thus, it stands to reason that
experimental psychologists in the area of behavioral psychology would be interested in verifying the
validity of the HGN test and should be included in
the relevant scientific community. Similarly, the
problem of alcohol's effect on driving ability is a
major concern to scientists in the area of highway
safety and they, too, should be included.
We disagree with the defendant's implication
that those in the field of highway safety or law enforcement are necessarily biased. We believe the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's
interest in funding research to identify the drunk
driver is not subject to question in this instance.
The NHTSA was addressing a complex problem:
every state has either a presumptive or "per se illegal" law that makes reference to BAC (typically .10
percent). Officers whose task it is to remove violators of these laws from the roads may, upon initial
suspicion, administer
tests. but until recently the relationship of the tests to specific BAC
levels was not well documented. The purpose of
NHTSA's program was to develop a test battery to
assist officers in discriminating between those
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drivers who are in violation of these laws and those
who are not. Furthermore, it is not to the advantage
of law enforcement in the highway safety field to
have an unreliable field sobriety test. It is inefficient to arrest and transport a driver for chemical
testing, only to find that he is not in violation of the
law. We believe that the work of highway safety
professionals and behavioral psychologists who
study effects of alcohol on behavior is directly affected by the claims and application of the HGN
test, so that both these groups must be included in
the relevant scientific community.

[ OJ

We are not forced to come to the same
conclusion with respect to neurologists, pharmacologists, ophthalmologists and criminalists. Although it is true that the form of
that
concerns us is the result of a neurological malfunction, we agree with Dr. Bums who testified that
"the field of neurology does not concern itself specifically with alcohol effects on performance and
even more specifically with field sobriety." She did
state, however, that a "very small segment of the
neurology community" concerns itself with the effects and has produced some literature. No argument has been made why the fields of pharmacology, ophthalmology and criminalistics (beyond
those concerned with detecting violators of DUI
laws) should be included in the relevant scientific
community and no convincing reason occurs to us.
We conclude, therefore, that to determine whether
the HGN test satisfies the Fr)!e requirement of general acceptance the appropriate disciplines include
behavioral psychology, highway safety and. to a
lesser extent, neurology and criminalistics.
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done for the United States Department of Transportation. These are listed in Appendix A.
At the evidentiary hearing Blake presented no
evidence to refute either the substance of the expert
opinion testimony or the contention that it had general acceptance. Blake and public defender amicus
instead argued that there is a paucity of literature
and that the appropriate scientific disciplines have
not yet had the opportunity to duplicate and evaluate Dr. Bums' work.
Our own research is listed in Appendix B. The
literature demonstrates to our satisfaction that those
professionals who have investigated the subject do
not dispute the strong correlation between BAC and
the **181 *279 different types of nystagmus. Cj
91
894
(concluding that lie detector tests have not been accorded such recognition). Furthermore, those who
have investigated the relation between BAC and
nystagmus as the eye follows a moving object have
uniformly found that the higher the BAC. the earlier the onset of involuntary jerking of the eyeball.
Although the publications are not voluminous, they
have been before the relevant communities a considerable period of time for any opposing views to
have surfaced. See Appendix B.
[: 1 j Based on all the evidence we conclude
there has been sufficient scrutiny of the HGN test
to permit a conclusion as to reliability. The
"general acceptance" requirement does not necessitate a showing of universal acceptance of the reliability of the scientific principle and procedure.
1'.

We now tum to the question of whether there
has been general acceptance of both the HGN test
and its underlying principle. The burden of proving
general acceptance is on the proponent of the new
technique; it may be proved by expert testimony
and scientific and legal literature. We have already
summarized the expert testimony presented by the
state, supra at 173. In addition, the state submitted
both scientific publications and reports of research

(unanimity of scientific opinion is not required); 1. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 164 (2d ed.1974) ("substantial majority" is sufficient to show general acceptance).
Neither must the principle and procedure be absolutely accurate or certain. Stale v Fa/de:. 91
280.
a1898.

fl
3J We believe that the HGN test satisfies
the Flye standard. The evidence demonstrates that
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the following propositions have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community: (1)
HGN occurs in conjunction with alcohol consumption; (2) its onset and distinctness are correlated to
BAC; (3) BAC in excess of .10 percent can be estimated with reasonable accuracy from the combination of the eyes' tracking ability, the angle of onset
of nystagmus and the degree of
at maximum deviation; and (4) officers can be trained to
observe these phenomena sufficiently to estimate
accurately whether BAC is above or below .10 percent. We therefore hold that, with proper foundation as to the techniques used and the officer's ability to use it (see Collins
at
testimony of defendant's nystagmus is admissible on the issue of a defendant's blood alcohol
level as would be other field sobriety test results on
the question of the accuracy of the chemical analysIS.

Our holding does not mean that evidence of
nystagmus is admissible to prove BAC of .10 percent or more in the absence of a laboratory
breath or urine. Such a use of
HGN test results would raise a number of due process problems different from those associated with
the chemical testing of bodily fluids. The arresting
officer's "reading" of the HGN test cannot be verified or duplicated by an independent party. See
1

( 9 7 9). The test's recognized margin of error provides problems as to criminal convictions
which require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. The circumstances under which the test is
administered at roadside may affect the reliability
of the test results. Nystagmus may be caused by
conditions other than alcohol intoxication. i\l1d finally, the far more accurate chemical testing
devices are readily available.

Our limitation on the use of HGN test results is
also consistent with Arizona's DUI statute. When
referring to the tests to be administered to determine BAC, the statute speaks in terms of taking
blood, urine and breath samples from the defendant
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for analysis. See AR.S. § 28-692(H). Clearly,
BAC under § 12-692 is to be determined deductively from analysis of bodily fluids, not inductively
from observation of involuntary bodily movements.
6J We also hold, therefore, that regardless of the quality and abundance of other evidence, a person may not be convicted of a violation
of A.R.S. § 28-692(B) without chemical
breath or urine showing a proscribed blood
alcohol content pursuant to title 28, article 5 of the
Arizona revised statutes. Similarly, the presumption
under A.R.S. § 28- *280 692(E)(3) that a defendant
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of subsection (A) must also rest on chemical
"analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath or
other bodily substance," AR.S. § 28- **182
692(E), as the statute clearly states, and not on a
BAC estimate based on nystagmus. Thus, evidence
of HGN test results is admissible, as is other evidence in subsection (B) cases, only to corroborate
the challenged accuracy of the chemical test results.
1
See
680
JO. It is admissible in subsection (A)
cases for the same purpose and, also, as evidence
that the driver is "under the influence." It is not admissible in any criminal case as direct independent
evidence to quantifY blood alcohol content.
CONCLUSION
We find that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test
properly administered by a trained police officer is
sufficiently reliable to be a factor in establishing
probable cause to arrest a driver for violating
AR.S. § 28-692(B). We further find that the horizontal gaze nystagmus test satisfies the Frye test for
reliability and may be admitted in evidence to corroborate or attack, but not to quantify, the chemical
analysis of the accused's blood alcohol content. It
may not be used to establish the accused's level of
blood alcohol in the absence of a chemical analysis
showing the proscribed level in the accused's blood,
breath or urine. In subsection (A) prosecutions it is
admissible, as is other evidence of defendant's behavior, to prove that he was "under the influence."
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We approve the court of appeals' opinion, as
modified, vacate the trial court's dismissal of the
Blake prosecution for violation of A.R.S. §
28-692(B), and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
HOLOHAN, c.J., GORDON, V.CJ .. and HAYS
and CAMERON, H, concur.
APPENDIX A
L Anderson, Schweitz & Snyder, Field Evaluation of a Behavioral Test BattelY for DWI, u.s.
Dept.
of
Transportation
Rep.
No.
DOT-HS-806--475 (1983) (field evaluation of the
field sobriety test battery (HGN, one leg stand, and
walk and tum) conducted by police officers from
four jurisdictions indicated that battery was approximately 80 percent effective in determining BAC
above and below .10 percent).
2. Bums & Moskowitz. Psychophysical Tests
(or DWI Arrest, U.S. Dept of Transportation Rep.
No. DOT-HS-802--424 (1977) (recommended the
three-test battery developed by SCRI (one leg
stand, walk and tum, and HGN) to aid officers in
discriminating BAC level).
3. Compton, Use of the Gaze Nvstagmus Test
to Screen Drivers at D WI Sobriety Checkpoints,
U.S. Dept. of Transportation (1984) (field evaluation of HGN test administered to drivers through
car window in approximately 40 seconds: "the
test scores identified 95% of the impaired
drivers" at 2; 15 percent false positive for sober
drivers, id.).
4. I R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DR1JNK
DRIVING CASES (3d ed. 1985) ("A strong correlation exists between the BAC and the angle of onset of [gaze] nystagmus." Id at § 8.15A[3] ).
5. Rashbass, The Relationship Between Saccadic and Smooth Tracking Eye Movements, 159 1.
PHYSIOL. 326 (1961) (barbiturate drugs interfere
with smooth tracking eye movement).
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and Field Test of Psychophysical Tests for DWI Arrests, U.S. Dept. of Transportation Rep. No.
DOT-HS-805-864 (1981) (standardized procedures for administering and scoring the SCRI threetest battery; participating officers able to classify 81
percent of volunteers above or below .10 percent).
7. Wilkinson, Kime & Purnell, Alcohol and
Human Eye Movement, 97 BRAIN 785 (1974) (oral
dose of ethyl alcohol impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement of all human subjects).

*281 APPE]\''DIX B
1. Aschan, Different Types o( Alcohol
140 ACTA OTOLAR'{NGOL SUPP. 69
(Sweden 1958) ("From a medico-legal viewpoint,
simultaneous recording of AGN [Alcohol Gaze
and PAN [positional alcoholic
should be of value, since it will show in which
phase the patient's blood alcohol curve is .... ").
**183 2. Aschan & Bergstedt, Positional Alcoholic
in Man Following Repeated Alcohol Doses, 80 ACTA OTOLARYNGOL SUPP. 330
(Sweden 1975) (abstract available on DIALOG, file
173 :Embase 1975-79) (degree of intoxication influences both PAN I and PAN II).
3. Aschan, Bergstedt, Goldberg & Laurell. Positional
in Man During and After Alcohol
Intoxication, 17 OJ. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL.
Sept. 1956. at 381. Study distinguishing two types
of alcohol-induced
P AN (positional alcoholic
I and PAN II. found intensity of
PAN I, with onset about one-half hour after alcohol
ingestion. was proportional to amount of alcohol
taken.
4. Baloh, Sharma, Moskowitz & Griffith, Effect
of Alcohol and Marijuana on Eye Movements, 50
AVIAT. SPACE ENVIRON. MED .. Jan. 1979, at
18
(abstract
available
on
DIALOG,
file
153 :Medline 1979-79) (smooth pursuit eye movement effects of alcohol overshadowed those of
marijuana).

6. Tharp, Bums & Moskowitz, Development
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5. Barnes, The Effects of Ethyl Alcohol on Visual Pursuit and Suppression of the Vestibulo-Ocular
Reflex, 406 ACTA OTOLARYNGOL SUPP. 161
(Sweden 1984) (ethyl alcohol disrupted visual pursuit eye movement by increasing number of nystagmic "catch-up saccades").
6. Church & Williams, Dose- and TimeDependenl Effects of Ethanol, 54
& CLIN. NElJROPHYSIOL.,
Aug. 1982, at 161 (abstract available on DIALOG,
file 11 :Psychinfo 1967-85 or file 72:Embase
1982-85) (positional alcohol
increased
with dose levels of ethanol).
7. Fregly, Bergstedt & GraybieL Relationships
Between Blood Alcohol, Positional Alcohol
and Postural Equilibrium, 28 OJ. OF STUD.
ON ALCOHOL, March 1967, at 1 L 17 (declines
from baseline performance levels correlated with
peak PAN I responses and peak blood alcohol levels).
8. Goldberg, Effects and After-Effects of Alcohol, Tranquilizers and Fatigue on Ocular Phenomena, ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFFIC 123
(1963) (of different types of
alcohol
gaze
is the most easily observed).
9. Helzer, Detecting DUIs Through the Use of
Nystagmus, LAW AND ORDER, Oct. 1984, at 93
(nystagmus is "a powerful tool for officers to use at
roadside to determine BAC of stopped drivers ...
[O]fficers can learn to estimate BACs to within an
average of 0.02 percent of chemical test readings."
Jd. at 94).
10. Lehti, The Effect of Blood Alcohol Concentration on the Onset of Gaze
136
BLUTALKOHOL 414 (West Germany 1976)
(abstract available on DIALOG. file 173:Embase
1975-79) (noted a statistically highly significant
correlation between BAC and the angle of onset of
nystagmus with respect to the midpoint of the field
of vision).
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11. Mizoi, Hishida & Maeba, Diagnosis of Alcohol Intoxication by the Optokinetic Test, 30 QJ.
OF STlJD. ON ALCOHOL 1 (March-lune 1969)
(optokinetic
ocular adaptation to movement of object before eyes, can also be used to detect central nervous system impairment caused by
alcohol. Optokinetic nystagmus is inhibited at BAC
of only .051 percent and can be detected by optokinetic nystagmus test. Before dosage subjects
could follow a speed of 90 degrees per second;
after, less than 70 degrees per second).
12. Murphree, Price & Greenberg, Effect of
Congeners in Alcoholic Beverages on the Incidence
of
27 OJ. OF STUD. ON ALCOHOL,
lune 1966, at 201 (positional
1S a consistent, sensitive indicator of alcohol intoxication).
13. Nathan, Zare, Ferneau & Lowenstein, Ef~
fects of Congener Differences in Alcoholic Beverages on the Behavior of Alcoholics, 5 OJ. OF
STUD. ON ALCOHOL SUPP., May 1970. at 87
(abstract available on DIALOG, file 11 :Psycinfo
1967-85) (incidence of nystagmus and other nystagmoid movements increased with duration of
drinking).
14. Norris, The Correlation of Angle of Onset
of
With Blood Alcohol **184 *282
Level. Report of a Field Trial, CALIF. ASS'N
CRlMINALISTICS NEWSLETTER, lune 1985, at
21 (The relationship between the ingestion of alcohol and the inset of various kinds of
"appears to be well documented." Id "While nystagmus appears to be useful as a roadside sobriety
test, at this time, its use to predict a person's blood
alcohol level does not appear to be warranted." Jd.
at 22).
15. Nuotto, Paiva & Seppala, Ya/oxone Ethanol Interaction in Experimental and Clinical Situations, 54 ACTA PHARMACOL. TOXICOL. 278
(1984) (abstract available on DIALOG, file
5: :Biosis Previews 1981-86) (ethanol alone doesdependently induced
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16. Oosterveld, Meineri & Paolucci, Quantitative Effect of Linear Acceleration on Positional Alcohol
45 AEROSPACE MEDICINE.
July 1974, at 695 (G-Ioading brings about PAN
even when subject has not ingested alcohol;
however when subjects ingested alcohol, no PAN
was found when subjects were in supine position,
even with G-force at 3).
17. Penttila, Lehti & Lonnqvist,
and
Disturbances in Psychomotor Functions Induced by
Psychotropic Drug Therapy, 1974 PSYCHIAT.
FENN. 315 (abstract available on DIALOG, file
173:Embase 1975-79) (psychotropic drugs induce

18. Savolainen, Riihimaki, Vaheri & Linnoila,
Effects of Xylene and Alcohol on Vestibular and
Visual Functions in Man, SCAND. J. WORK ENVIRON. HEALTH 94 (Sweden 1980) (abstract
available on DIALOG, file 172:Embase 1980-81
on file 5:Biosis Previews 1981-86) (the effects of
alcohol on vestibular functions (e.g. positional
were dose-dependent).
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tern appeared consistently in the following order:
(l) abnormality of CETP, (2) positional alcohol
(3)
tracking pattern,
(4) alcohol gaze
22. Zyo, Medico-Legal and Psychiatric Studies
on the Alcoholic Intoxicated Offender, 30 JAP ANESE 1. OF LEGAL MED., No.3, 1976, at 169
(abstract available on DIALOG, file 21:Nationai
Criminal Justice Reference Service 1972-85)
(recommends use of nystagmus test to determine
somatic and mental symptoms of alcohol intoxication as well as BAC).
Ariz.,1986.
State v. Superior Court In and For Cochise County
149 Ariz. 269, 718 P.2d 171,60 A.L.RAth 1103
END OF DOCUMENT

19. Seelmeyer, Nystagmus, A Valid DUI Test,
LAW AND ORDER, July 1985, at 29 (horizontal
gaze nystagmus test is used in "at least one law enforcement agency in each of the 50 states" and is "a
legitimate method of establishing probable cause."
Id).
20. Tharp, Moskowitz & Bums. Circadean Ef~
(ects on Alcohol Gaze
(paper presented
at 20th annual meeting of Society for Psychophysiological Research), abstract in 18 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, March 1981 (highly significant
correlation between angle of onset of AGN and
BAC).
21. Umeda & Sakata, Alcohol and the Oculomotor System, 87 ANNALS OF OTOLOGY,
RHINOLOGY & LARYNGOLOGY, May-June
1978, at 392 (in volunteers whose "caloric eye
tracking pattern" (CETP) was normal before alcohol intake, influence of alcohol on oculomotor sys-
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EXHIBIT B

Idaho State Police Forensic Services

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

The Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) hereby certifies and approves Alcohol
Simulator Solution Lot Number 10802 (a product manufactured by RepCo Marketing Inc.) to be
used to conduct perfom1ance verification checks within the State of Idaho in accordance with
the analytical methods, policies and/or procedures promulgated by the Department governing
breath alcohol examinations. ISPFS also approves of the manufacturer oftrus solution (RepCo
Marketing Inc.) to provide Alcohol Simulator Solution Lot Number 10802 in the State of Idaho.
This lot has a target value of 0.080 with a range of 0.072 to 0.088 grams of ethyl alcohol/210
liters of vapor.
The expiration date for this lot number is August 9th , 2012 at 11 :59 PM.

8 - 3/-10
Date

STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.

County of Kootenai)
On this 31 st day of August, in the year 2010, before me, JoAnn Hutchison, a notary
public, personally appeared Jeremy Johnston, known to me to be the person whose name is
subscribed to the within instrument as a Forensic Scientist for the Idaho State Police Forensic
Services, and acknowledge to me that he executed the same as such Scientist.

~U.l.4..(.44-~t:.&~~~~~_Notary Public

Commission Expires:

/:?-/tS J:71O/~
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